Nor Are We Out of It

Those are the lines Marlowe put into the mouth of the demon Mephistofeles in Dr. Faustus, “Why, this is Hell, nor are we out of it.”  Sartre put it more succinctly in No Exit, “Hell is other people.”  And Sherman most precisely, with “War is Hell.”  So, we cautiously begin our benevolent journey to save one group of people by destroying another, and the air does once more grow dim and sulfurous. But we lack even Mephistofeles’ excuse, “Thinkest thou that one who has seen the face of God and tasted the eternal joys of Heaven can but suffer 10 thousand Hells in the memory of their loss?” – Hell loves company.  We resume again the Never-Ending War, and as we slog on through the 21^st century battling a ceaseless war in the Middle East with one hand and ceaseless climate change with the other, we may indeed come to remember the 20^th century as heavenly.

I know all the good reasons for re-entering the fray, and they are good. It is clearly intended as a humanitarian effort on our part to stop the brutal slaughter of innocents.  That supports the containment principle of firm resistance to any behaviors, like Assad’s use of chemical warfare, that are clearly contrary to international law.  The common assertion these days that we are inconsistent in our Middle Eastern policy stems from a failure to recognize what our policies actually are.  But it is also clear that a  significant part of that slaughter is a deliberate attempt to egg us on to enter the war and stir up the “arab street” against another incursion by the West into Arab affairs.  That is how ISIL’s brutality differs from that of Assad, and we have to take that into account.  I respect the cautious way we are proceeding, complete with vows of “No boots on the ground”, though our military seems already champing at the bit to stroll through desert sand again.  The one big reason to enter would be that it would make a difference.  If it does not make a difference, then even the principles of Just War do not support our being there. Our military seems to think it would, but of course every war in the history of the world has started with that premise. The big reason for not going in is that any success on our part that does make a difference will shift the power balances between multitudes of warring factions.  That will inevitably be perceived as taking sides in an internal war, and increase Middle Eastern resentments against us.  At best, it may result in collapse of a faction we don’t like, the “bad guys”, but that in turn would produce a premature pause without real resolution of conflicts only they can resolve. And that would generate only the seeds of continued conflict, not lasting peace.

So, what are we to do? Nuanced diplomacy does not seem to work with ISIL.  As with Missouri mules, first you have to get their attention.  But the rest of the Middle East will require a lot of the nuanced approach.  We need to respect the views of Middle Eastern governments, even those we don’t get along with like Iran. And part of our demands need to be a quieting down on their part of the bad-mouthing we are constantly getting; “public diplomacy” needs to be a big part of our arsenal.  On balance, the course proposed by the Administration seems as close to workable as we may get. But the generals may have to be told to stop their “Let, me in, coach” chaffing. They may be absolutely right that total victory cannot be achieved without “boots on the ground”, but sometimes total victory cannot be the goal. Total peace in the Middle East may not include total military victory on our part.  As Bismarck noted, sometimes “War is too important to be left to generals.”