Further examination of history reveals interesting
patterns in our rampages. David Rothkopf,
in Power, Inc., reports these
trends: the 16th century C.E. included 34 wars between major powers,
the 18th included 17 such wars, and the 20th included 15.
He also reports a decline in the average duration of wars from 1.6 years down
to .4 years and an increase in periods of no active major wars from 5 percent
up to 47 percent. Our wars are becoming
less frequent, shorter and more violent.
They also have become much more expensive.
It’s tempting to cite Eisenhower’s warning about
the military-industrial complex at this point, but the credit or blame goes
back to Napoleon. When Gustavus Adolphus
and the Swedish army became the decisive factor in the resolution of the 30
Years War, he had done it with 73,000 troops, of whom 30,000 were mercenaries,
and with cheap muskets. 150 years later,
Napoleon accomplished his conquests of Europe with a universal draft mustering
about 1 million troops, with an equally elaborate military infrastructure, and with cannon. That was the birth of modern warfare, with
its huge armies and complex weaponry, all of which are expensive. The estimates are that the U.S. has spent
between one and two trillion dollars on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the
past ten years, an amount critics have noted that about equals the federal
deficit. As Rothkopf notes, the expense
of war has priced all but a few major nations out of the market. That in turn produces effects that reach
beyond war itself.
For one, the ability to project coercive force has
always been perceived as a defining power of sovereignty. States with no army to speak of are not
regarded as major, no matter how prosperous or well run. The defining measure of military power these
days is nuclear weaponry, and of about 190 countries in the world today, only
about 9 are thought to be nuclear. Somehow, the rest don’t seem to count. But such countries do count, as they always
have, and their presence is now projected by alliances of all sorts, from the
U.N. and NATO to NAFTA, SEATO and beyond.
These alliances in turn hasten the growth of international law and
behavioral norms promoting peaceful resolution of issues. And as sovereign authority is more and more exercised
by unions and alliances, it is in the process transferring from military to other sovereign issues. A big part of the European debt controversy
involves the tension between EU sovereignty and that of its constituent members
over economic policy.
Second, the expense of war is more and more being
used as a political weapon itself.
Ronald Reagan vowed to break the wallet of the Soviet Union through his
Star Wars Program, and perhaps he did.
In the U.S., conservatives have sought to cut social program spending by
not paying for war expenses though increased tax revenue, thereby creating
politically explosive deficits. Through
history, political rhetoric to the contrary, most national deficits have been
created by the expense of war, not the costs of the domestic economy, and have
been paid for through tax revenue increases.
Third, the economic expense of war consists
largely of huge transfer payments from the government to private corporations
in the form of bewildering varieties of defense contracts. This in turns enables these corporations,
Eisenhower’s “military-industrial complex”, to spend millions each year in
lobbying for policies that further enhance their incomes, at the expense of
national interests. Results of this
include such things as the cost of weaponry climbing a steady 6 percent
annually, while the rest of the economy is in recession.
More importantly, our obsession with improving our
skills at killing each other drains energy and resources from our abilities to work
together to evolve the planet to a more peaceful place. The costs of war have been a boon that has
generated the growth of alliances among people, and has hastened the
development of international norms of more peaceful behavior. It is time to promote those, and not war
itself. We no longer can afford
otherwise.